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Percy Selwyn
Many governments use subsidies as part of their
social welfare policies, in this note E consider the
effectiveness of subsidies as a means of meeting basic
needs, and in particular I examine the case for food
subsidies.
For the purposes of this paper, a subsidy is defined as
a negative consumption tax designed to lower the
market priceand presumably increase the consump-
tionof some good or service. The total impact of
subsidies can be adequately considered only in the
context of the whole fiscal system, but I shall assume
that governments have the choice between the
payment of income supplements to those unable to
afford a minimum level of basic needs, while leaving
their provision to the market, and the subsidisation
(including the free provision) of the goods and
services which it includes in the list of basic needs. In
this comparison, I take the fiscal system as given.
The case for subsidies as compared with direct
financial subventions can be summarised as follows:
The social cost of the additional consumption made
possible by the subsidy may be less than the benefit
derived from the additional consumption which it
makes possible. Thus the cost of admitting more
patients to an underutilised hospital may be very
small. This is of course the principle behind marginal
cost pricing, and is especially applicable to 'lumpy'
types of investment.
Markets for the provision of basic needs may not
work well. Potential consumers may be badly
informed. Thus a system of relying on the market for
the provision of education or health services will
favour middle-class familieswho will have the
information required to choose between various
types of provisionover poor familieswho may
not. Because of monopoly or other market
imperfections, the supply of basic commodities may
be inadequate or expensive. If the problem is one of
monopoly, however, governments could in principle
provide the goods or services concerned at less than
the market price but without any subsidy. Monopoly
or imperfect competition may justify government
intervention; they do not necessarily justify subsidies.
External benefits may arise from greater consump-
tion of the good or service concerned than would
occur at market prices. Thus the whole community
may stand to gain if individual ill-health is reduced.
The elimination of malnutrition may increase output,
and the benefit of at least part of this increase will
accrue to the community (e.g. through the fiscal
system).
A system of direct financial aids to people below
some basic minimum would necessitate arrangements
for selecting those entitled to benefit, and deciding on
its extent. A selective system of this kind involves
problems of accessand may indeed yield greater
benefits to those involved in administering the
system than to the intended beneficiaries. Subsidies,
however, could be non-selective, and may therefore
not involve questions of access. They could thus be
more cost-effective than direct income supplements.
Income supplements may involve problems of the
distribution of consumption within families. If
additional income is made available to the head of
the family, it may not go to increase the consumption
of those in most neede.g. pregnant or nursing
women, or pre-school children. Through the
subsidisation and distribution of commodities
(especially foodstuffs) it may be possible to direct aid
to those in most need. This argument is, however,
inconsistent with the case against direct income
supplements.
Poor people would spend additional income on the
'wrong' things'unnecessary' consumption (wed-
dings, drink, non-nutritious food) rather than 'basic
needs'--i.e. poor people have a high income elasticity
of demand for 'non-basic' goods and services.
Alternatively, it is argued that, in a capitalist system,
poor consumers are persuaded to buy things that they
do not really 'need'. Government can correct these
distortions by subsidising or freely distributing those
goods and services which enter into basic needs.
This last argument assumes that 'officials', 'poli-
ticians' or 'experts' are better informed about poor
people's basic needs than are the poor themselves.
Indeed it calls into question the whole concept of
basic needs. Are basic needs definable by experts, or
by the poor themselves? If we accept that wants are
socially determined, is determination by government
'better' than determination through the market? in
Pigou's words (1952 :759) "it is a very delicate matter
for the State to determine authoritatively in what
way poor people shall distribute scanty resources
amoiig various competing needs".
These arguments (which are familiar from the public
finance literature) clearly have different weights.
Many who would accept the case based on monopoly,
external benefits, or lack of appropriate information,
might doubt that the poor are more stupid than
experts or bureaucrats. But even if not entirely
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accepted, these arguments clearly have sonic force.
We need, however, to consider in rather more detail
who are likely to be the actual beneficiaries of
subsidies. To illustrate the problems, I shall consider
subsidies on basic foodstuffs.
Food subsidies take many forms. They may be
subsidies to farmers; most of their benefit accrues to
growers who obtain higher prices for their products
than they would without subsidies, consumer prices
being little affected. We shall assume that the
immediate benefit of the subsidy accrues to consumers
consumer prices are lowered by the full amount of
the subsidy. This will clearly be so where the
subsidised food is distributed free or where it is
imported and he importing country is too small to
influence world prices. The distribution of benefit will
depend on three factorsthe identity of the
purchasers or recipients of the subsidised foodstuffs,
the effect of the subsidy on wage rates, and the effects
on employment.
Food subsidies may be selective or generalthat is,
subsidised food may be made available to particular
groups (as in food aid projects) or may be generally
on sale. Thus there may be schemes to distribute free
or cheap food to 'vulnerable groups', or for free
school meals to be provided. Again, food subsidies
may be associated with a rationing scheme so as to
ensure that large or industrial consumers do not
benefit unduly. Again, the types of food being
gubgidiged may be those mainly consumed by the
poor. Thus subsidised rice in Mauritius is normally of
a quality which is not bought by the rich.
In principle, food subsidies should he selective if they
are to be of direct help to the poor. But there are
several qualifications to this simple formula.
First, the proportion of total expenditure on basic
food (e.g. cereals) by poor people is greater than that
by rich people. A non-selective subsidy on such foods
will therefore he of far greater relative benefit to the
poor than to the rich. Moreover, since by far the
greater part of the population in most developing
countries is poor and (above a certain income level)
the price and income elasticity of demand for basic
foodstuffs is low, most of the increased food
consumption stimulated by a general subsidy on such
foods will be by the poor. For middle class families
such a non-selective subsidy will amount to a general
income supplement--il will release purchasing power
for additional expenditure elsewhere.
Second, a deliberately selective system will involve
some means of identifying beneficiaries. Such
systenis involve similar problems of access and
exclusion to those already referred to as affecting
minimum income support schemes.
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In addition, sime types of selective system may be
inherently biased against the poorest people. Thus
school meals benefit only children in school: if
children from the poorest families or areas do not go
to school they will not benefit. This is not to argue
against school meals: they may have various
favourable external effects--encouraging more child-
ren to come to school, or increasing the alertness of
children in their studies. But one should be aware of
such unintended bias.
So far I have argued that although, in principle, food
subsidies to the poor should be selective, even a non-
selective system of subsidies on basic foodstuffs may
help them. But a subsidy of less than 100 per cent will
be of help1 only to those who have some cash income.
Below a certain income level, the subsidy will be
regressive, and the actual direct impact then will
depend on the extent of the subsidy and the
distribution of income.
The principal potential indirect effect of food
subsidies is on the wage level. If wages are at
subsistence level, lowering the cost of subsistence
may reduce the level of wages. As far as unorganised,
marginal workers are concerned, food subsidies
could lower the wage rate at which they would begin
to accept employment. But in many developing
countries, wages in the formal sector are substantially
above subsistence level, and the factors determining
the distribution of income between wages and
profits will vary from sector to sector. Thus
governments may enact minimum wage regulations
(which in practice will exclude people in many low-
wage occupations); trade unions in certain industries
may be successful in increasing wage rates, through
the limitation of entry into the industry or other
means; employers may increase the capital intensity
of their operations and thus increase the share of
profits in output. The effect may be (and frequently is)
to create a privileged group of employees earning
wages which are high by local standards, and a large
number of people who, when they are employed, have
a weak bargaining position and correspondingly low
wages. To this must be added the effect of inflation.
Where wage bargaining is centrally concerned with
changes in price levels, measures to reduce the rate of
increase of prices (e.g. through food subsidies) will
tend to redLiee the rate of increase of wages.
The impact of food subsidies on wage rates is
therefore likely to be complex. In certain circum-
stances food subsidies could reduce wagesor at
least act as a brake on increases. Thus such subsidies
could accrue to employers rather than to wage-
earners. In practice, however, subsidies are only one
of many factors affecting the distribution of income
as between wages and profits, and their effects are
likely to be difilcult to predict a puloil.
In so far as food subsidies reduce wages, what effect
do they have on employment? The case for the use of
food subsidies to promote employment was put in
the Meade Report (Meade et al, 1968) on Mauritius:
wage rates should be kept stable, so that
automatically in the search for low costs
producers and employers (governmental as well as
private) will have an incentive, whenever there is a
choice, to introduce new products and processes
which involve the use of labour rather than the use
of capital and land. .. But a policy involving wage
restraint does not mean that there can be no
measures taken over the coming years to improve
standards of living . . . The subsidisation of the
cost of living is a. . . way in which the standard of
living of the worker can be supported without any
direct raising of labour costs".
One issue here, as the report recognised, is how far
food subsidies actually do act as a restraint on
increases in money wage levels, and if they do, what
the impact of such wage reductions is on employment.
It would be simplistic to suggest that there is a clear
and direct relation between wage levels and employ-
ment. The structure of wages and salaries (e.g. as
between urban and rural occupations, white collar
and other jobs) may be as important as their overall
level.
Again, where output and employment are heavily
dependent on local incomes and expenditure, and
supply constraints are of minor importance (the
classical Keynesian situation) wage restraint could
have a negative effect on employment. But in
comparatively open economies, where the level of
demand depends mainly on external factors, wage
restraint could help employment.
The choice of techniques argument used in the Meade
Report may however have only a limited application;
in many activities techniques appear to be virtually
given by the equipment and machinery available on
world markets. But in many countries the cost of
imported capital equipment is undoubtedly lowered
by the existence of cheap foreign exchange, tax
treatment of investment, and cheap loans. In so far as
such practices favour capital-intensive operations and
products, a policy of wage restraint could do
something to correct the resulting distortions.
All this suggests that, in certain circumstances, food
subsidies could help employment. The relation
between the two is, however, uncertain. Indeed, if a
government wishes to subsidise employment, it might
do so more effectively through direct wage subsidies
than by the indirect means of food subsidies.
Can the argument based on food subsidies be
extended to other, widely used types of subsidy on
such basic needs as housing, water and education?
How effective are such subsidies in the meeting of
these needsand in particular the needs of the
poorest citizens?
Such subsidies may raise problems of a different kind
from those involved in food subsidies. For example,
the income elasticity of demand for many of these
other servicesnotably education and housingis
far greater than that for basic foodstuffs. Even with
a service such as water, we may assume that rich
people have more appliances than poor people, and
will therefore consume more.
Moreover, if loans for house building or purchase
are subsidised through the tax system, the
beneficiaries will be those at the top end of the income
tax scale, buying or building the most expensive
houses. Middle class families may be able to gain
access to the best schools for their childreneven in
a system where access to such schools is in theory
through competitive examinations. Thus unselective
subsidies on such goods and services are likely to be
regressive and their cost-effectiveness in terms of
meeting basic needs will be poor.
What strategies are available for the use of subsidies
in such situations? First, subsidies can be made
selective. But this entails the sacrifice of one of the
main potential advantages of subsidies over income
supplementation. Selectively subsidised housing
implies the creation of a privileged group who
benefit from the subsidy as against the mass of the
people who do not. Access to the subsidised service
becomes a tradeable commodityand has value in
the hands of those who control its supply.
Secondly, selection can be effected implicitly by the
provision or subsidisation of goods and services
consciously intended to be 'inferior' in some sense to
those demanded by the rich. Thus schools, medical
services and so on may be provided on a 'pauper'
level for the poor, the rich being encouraged to make
their own provision. This is a common strategy, but
there are clear social objections to it.
Thirdly, pricing systems may provide for a measure
of cross-subsidisation between rich and poor. Thus
water charges may allow for an initial supply of free
or cheap water for small consumers, with rising
marginal charges for large consumers. Such systems
are practicable (and indeed used) oniy where the
measurement of consumption is simple. Moreover,
they do not solve the problem of access; those who
have no supply will not be subsidised, and at the
lower end of the scale, such a system may be
regressive.
There is thus no completely satisfactory system for
subsidising goods and services with a high income
ela'sticity of demand. In the last resort, any fair
system would involve means tests. And in many
countries such tests have the effect of excluding those
in most need.
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The regressive impact of certain subsidies has drawn
attention to the possibility of using income
supplements as an alternative means of providing
basic needs. If the basic needs' of the poor could be
provided if only they had sufficient income to pay for
them, direct income supplements would have several
advantages over subsidies. They would permit a
greater range of choice to their recipients; they would
deliberately exclude all but the neediest; they may
avoid many of the administrative problems involved
in selective subsidies. But they raise their own type of
access problems. Even highly sophisticated social
welfare systems (as in the UK) find difficulty in
identifying those in most need and meeting their
needs. Whatever the rules governing such systems,
they may have the effect of excluding the poorest and
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neediest, and of providing as much benefit to those
administering the arrangements as to their clients.
1f, then, the choice lies between the selective
subsidisation of basic needs, unselective subsidies
and general income support, unselective subsidies
have a clear advantage in terms of access, but will be
appropriate for only a limited range of goods and
services. Over a wide area of social provision there is
no clear general advantage (or disadvantage) in
subsidies over income support.
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